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STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978)

1

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-302 (1978)

1

Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2-2(3) (i)(Supp. 1988)

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\

ROBERT W. DUNN,

Petitioner-Appellant, ii
V.

1

GERALD L. COOK, Warden,
Utah State Prison

i

Case No, 88 0067

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a dismissal of a petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2-2(3)(i)(Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly found that

petitioner's claims were procedurally barred because he could and
should have raised his claims on direct appeal?
2.

Whether this Court is precluded from considering

the merits of petitioner's claim because of the lack of record
support and the lower court's finding of procedural default?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was convicted of Aggravated Kidnapping, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302
(1978), and Second Degree Murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978), after a jury trial
on December 31, 1980, in the Sixth Judicial District Court, in

and for Sevier County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbsf
Judge, presiding (R. 52). Petitioner was sentenced on January
14, 1981, to two concurrent terms of five years to life in the
Utah State Prison. Ici. On direct appeal, petitioner's trial
counsel filed an "Anders" brief.

(R. 65-75)

separate pro se brief (R. 77-85).

Petitioner filed a

This Court affirmed

petitioner's conviction in State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709 (Utah
1982) (R. 88-89; Addendum "A").
On July 10, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy, Judge, presiding (R. 2-5; Addendum "B").

Upon the

State's motion and the sworn testimony of petitioner, Judge
Murphy dismissed the petition because petitioner could and should
have raised all issues concerning his conviction on direct
appeal. (R. 143-48; Addendum "C M ).

Petitioner now appeals that

dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner and one Howard Scott were hitchhiking in
Barstow, California when the victim, Ernest Sprinkle, gave them a
ride in his motorhome (R. 88). The three men went to Las Vegas
and then to Mesquite, Nevada. J^d.

In Mesquite, Sprinkle became

intoxicated and petitioner began driving the motorhome. Id.
Sometime after leaving Mesquite, Sprinkle was struck on
the head with a pistol, bound, and placed in the bathroom of the
motorhome. Jd.

In Richfield, Utah, a stop was made at a service

station to obtain a fuse for the CB radio in the motorhome.
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Id.

While at the service station, Sprinkle gained consciousness and
began to pound on the rear window of the motorhome with his hands
still bound,

jld. Petitioner and Scott quickly left the service

station with petitioner driving and Scott in the rear of the
motorhome to subdue Sprinkle. Id.

A service station attendant

reported his observations to the police. Id.
A Utah Highway Patrolman, having been alerted by the
service station attendant's call, observed the motorhome in
Salina. Id.

The officer followed the motorhome for one or two

miles and stopped the vehicle.
arrested.

Ld.

Id.

Petitioner and Scott were

Sprinkle's body was found in the motorhome, as

was a .25 caliber pistol. Id. at 88-89.

Sprinkle had died as a

result of two gunshot wounds inflicted by the pistol. Ld. at 89.
Despite petitioner's defense of duress, the jury
convicted petitioner of Second Degree Murder and Aggravated
Kidnapping. Td. at 88-9. On appeal, petitioner's trial counsel
filed an "Anders" brief and requested to withdraw from the case.
(R. 65-75, 89). The Anders brief raised four claims of error:
(1) that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for
change of venue; (2) that the trial court erred in not
suppressing evidence of bullets which were found in his
belongings; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury verdict; and, (4) that the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence a photograph of the victim's body. Id.
Petitioner also filed a pro se brief in which he
claimed:

(1) that the police lacked probable cause to arrest

petitioner; (2) that the police conducted an illegal search and
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seizure; and, (3) that the evidence was insufficient. (R. 77-85,
89).

This Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and stated that

"[djefense counsel has complied in every respect with the
"Anders" requirements . . .- (R. 89; Addendum "A").

State v.

Dunn, 646 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah 1982).
On July 10, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court (R. 2-5).
In his petition, petitioner raised the following claims:

(1)

that the trial court erred in denying a change of venue; (2) in
admitting a photograph; (3) in denying petitioner's motion to
suppress evidence; (4) in admitting into evidence petitioner's
prior convictions; and, (5) that petitioner's counsel was
ineffective in failing to make proper objections; (6) in failing
to appeal issues requested by petitioner; (7) in failing to
prepare accomplice jury instructions; (8) in failing to obtain
evidence from a trailer before its removal from the State; (9) in
stipulating to the admission of photographs; (10) in stipulating
to the entry of evidence which may have been inadmissable as
improperly seized or for inadequate chain of custody; (11) in
filing an Anders brief on appeal; and, (12) that he was denied a
fair trail due to jury selection errors; (13) juror bias; and,
(14) juror access to information from a co-defendant's trial (R.
2-5; Addendum "B").
In response, the State moved to dismiss the petition on
the basis that petitioner's claims were either addressed on
appeal or could and should have been raised on direct appeal. (R.
58-63).

After a hearing on the motion, and based upon the
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arguments of the parties and sworn testimony of the petitioner,
the trial court found that all issues raised by petitioner could
and should have been raised at the time of appeal (R. 143-48).
Accordingly, the court denied and dismissed the petition. Id.
Defendant now appeals that dismissal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because petitioner's alleged errors could and should
have been raised on direct appeal, he cannot raise them for the
first time in a post-conviction relief action.

Alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel claims should not qualify for
the -unusual circumstances" exception to waiver doctrine which
precludes post-conviction relief on issues which could and should
have been raised on direct appeal.

In the present case,

petitioner filed a separate pro se brief on appeal raising
several issues.

However, he failed to assert the alleged errors

he raises for the first time in the present post-conviction
action.

Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that

petitioner procedurally waived the claims asserted in his
petition.
Because the trial court declined to reach the merits of
petitioner's claims due to procedural default, this Court should
not consider the unsupported allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel beyond a determination whether the trial
properly found procedural default to exi^t.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
PETITIONER COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL
ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CONVICTION ON DIRECT
APPEAL.
Petitioner first asserts that the District court erred
in summarily dismissing his Habeas Corpus petition as
procedurally defective.

Petitioner's assertion is meritless.

It is well settled law in Utah that if alleged errors
could have been raised on direct appeal, this court is "precluded
under basic principles of appellate review from addressing them
now."

Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 9 (Sup. Ct. October

26, 1988)

In stating a post-conviction claim, a petitioner must

allege an "obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial
denial of a constitutional right in the trial of a matter; . . . •'

id.
This Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah
1983) clearly emphasized the standard for Habeas Corpus review:
It is therefore well settled in this state
that allegations of error that could have
been but were not raised on appeal from a
criminal conviction cannot be raised by
habeas corpus or post-conviction review,
except in unusual circumstances.
A much-quoted statement of the type of
errors that are and are not cognizable by
habeas corpus is the following from this
Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Turner,
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969
(1968) (Crockett, C.J.):
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordinary remedy which is properly
invocable only when the court
had no jurisdiction over the
person or the offense, or where
~fi-

the requirements of law have
been so disregarded that the
party is substantially and
effectively denied due process
of law, or where some such fact
is shown that it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine
the conviction. If the
contention of error is something
which is known or should be
known to the party at the time
the judgement was enteredf it
must be reviewed in the manner
and within the time permitted by
regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and
is not subject to further
attack, except in some such
unusual circumstance as we have
mentioned above. Were it
otherwise, the regular rules of
procedure governing appeals and
the limitations of time
specified therein would be
rendered impotent.
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104-05 (bracketed material and
emphasis in original). The standard review was further detailed
by this Court in Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Sup. Ct.
Oct. 26, 1988) as follows:
On appeal from denial of habeas corpus
relief, "we survey the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment;
and we will not reverse if there is a
reasonable basis therein to support the trial
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ
should be granted."
Id. at 10, quoting Velasguez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443
P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968)(citations omitted).

In Codianna, this

Court rejected the argument that ineffective assistance of
counsel necessarily constitutes "unusual circumstances- that
would allow petitioner to bypass the regular appellate process in
favor of Habeas Corpus.

The Court statedt
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To permit the inevitable instances of
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify
for the "unusual circumstances'9 exception
would allow that exception to swallow up the
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative
appeal mechanism in contravention of the
finality of criminal judgments that is the
settled policy of this state.
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1105.
Likewise, in Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497
P.2d 34 (1972), this Court stated;
He [Zumbrunnen] pursued this petition, after
his time for appeal from the conviction had
expired. He claimed . . . his counsel, who
assisted him at his request, was incompetent.
[This point] could have been urged on a
regular appeal. This court repeatedly has
said the writ cannot be used as a substitute
for such appeal. • .
Id. at 35.
Similarly, in Matthew v. Cook/ 754 P.2d 666 (Utah
1988), this Court said that w[p]laintiff did not show cause why
he failed to follow the route of regular appellate procedure and
that he suffered prejudice as a result of his default.11

Id. at

667.
Analagously, this Court recently held in Andrews v.
Shulsen, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Sup. Ct. October 27, 1988), that a
petitioner must show Hgood cause" as to why claims raised in a
Habeas Corpus proceeding, which could or should have been raised
earlier, were not raised in prior post-conviction proceedings.
Id. at 12. Without a showing of good cause it is simply an
"abuse of the writ and requires dismissal of the petition.In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121
(1967), this Court addressed a similar issue.
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In Bryant,

Id.

petitioner claimed, -that because of his inability to communicate
he was not and could not be represented effectively by counsel."
Id. at 122. The District Court denied the petition and this
Court affirmed,

^d. 122-3.

In discussing the Bryant case, the

this Court said:
This proceeding is an attempt to do that
which should not be done nor countenanced in
our procedure: to turn habeas corpus into an
appellate review. That is not its purpose,
and it is not so intended. The regular steps
of criminal procedure provided for in our law
give adequate protections of the rights of
one accused of crime and safeguards against
conviction of the innocent. They afford full
opportunity to present and have determined
any matters of defense, and to make
objections to any error or impropriety that
may affect his rights. Moreover, after
judgment is entered, there is assured a right
of appeal within the proper time to seek
redress for any such error or transgression
of those rights. When this procedure has
been followed the judgment should normally be
final. It should not be subjected to a
continual merry-go-round of collateral
attacks upon various and specious pretexts as
some courts are prone to permit nowadays. In
our opinion such an inconsiderate attitude
toward final judgments regularly arrived at
by courts of competent jurisdiction robs the
law of the dignity and respect it is entitled
to. It tends to degrade the whole process of
law enforcement and the administration of
justice and thus to undermine the good order
of society it is purposed to maintain.
£d. at 122.
In McRoy v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 88 Nev. 267,
496 P.2d 162 (1972), a petitioner was convicted and his attorney
filed an "Anders" brief. 496 P.2d 1663.

Petitioner McRoy then

filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming inadequate
assistance of counsel because, in his opinion, the "Anders" brief
was inadequate.

Id.

The District Court denied the petition and

the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

Lei., at 164. The Nevada

Supreme Court concluded that because the petitioner had ample
opportunity to raises issues pro se on direct appeal, his habeas
corpus appeal was frivolous.

Id.

In a case directly on point, this Court invoked the
doctrine of waiver or procedural default in affirming the summary
dismissal of a petition claiming ineffective counsel.

In Hafen

v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), the defendant was convicted
and sentenced to prison.

Jd., at 876. The defendant appealed

and his conviction was affirmed. Id.

He then sought Habeas

Review and claimed that his trial attorney "failed to honor his
request to challenge a juror who appellant knew.

[He] also

claimed that his trial attorney failed to raise that issue on
appeal although appellant had so requested."

Ld., at 876.

Naturally, in his post-conviction action he claimed "he was
denied effective assistance of counsel. • . " Ri. The lower
court:
dismissed his petition on the ground that he
had waived any right to raise the issue of
the failure of his attorney to challenge the
juror. The court determined that it would
not grant an evidentiary hearing on that
issue since it could have been raised at
appellant's trial or on appeal. • . •
Id.

The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and stated:
We explained further, in Brown v. Turner, 21
Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), that "If the
contention of error is something which is
known or should be known to the party at the
time the judgment was entered, it must be
reviewed in the manner and within the time
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and is not subject
to further attack, except in some such
unusual circumstances as we have mentioned
-10-

above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules
of procedure governing appeals and the
limitations of time specified therein would
be rendered impotent."
Waiver was found in Schad v. Turnerf
supra, where the petitioner in a petition for
habeas corpus attempted to raise as an issue
that the District Attorney had exceeded the
bounds of propriety in his cross-examination
of the petitioner at the trial. We there
observed that since that was an issue which
could have been raised on the petitioner's
former appeal of his case to this Court, we
would not take cognizance of it on a later
petition for habeas corpus.
If the appellant's counsel did in fact fail
to honor his request to challenge the juror,
the appellant had the adequate opportunity at
the trial to have made complaint to the
court. Furthermore, following his conviction
that issue could have been raised by him in
this Court in his appeal which pended in this
Court for many months. In view of his
silence, the trial judge correctly ruled that
he had waived any claim of error in this
regard. There are not here any of the
"unusual circumstances" referred to in Bryant
v. Turner, supra.
Id.

Thus, this Court held that Hafen waived review of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to
raise the issue at trial or while his direct appeal was pending.
In the instant case, petitioner's trial counsel filed
an Anders brief raising four issues on direct appeal. (R. 65-75,
89)

Additionally, petitioner filed a separate pro se brief

raising three issues. (R. 77-85, 89). Petitioner did not raise
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Jd.

This Court

affirmed petitioner's conviction stating that M[d]efense counsel
has complied in every respect with the "Anders" requirements . .
."

(R. 87-89; Addendum H A M ) .

State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709, 711

(Utah 1982).
n_

Approximately five years later, petitioner filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus raising fourteen claims of
error including ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel. (R. 2-5; Addendum "B").

After a hearing on the State's

Motion to dismiss, and based upon the arguments of the parties
and sworn testimony of petitioner, the trial court found that all
issues raised by petitioner could and should have been raised on
direct appeal (R. 143-48; Addendum M C M ) .
The present case is indistinguishable from Hafen.

In

fact, petitioner in the present case was not merely silent as was
Hafeny but filed a separate pro se brief on direct appeal raising
three claims of error.

Noticeably absent from petitioner's brief

is any claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate
counsel.

Thus, the present case represents a more compelling

basis for waiver than was the case in Hafen.

Petitioner was not

merely silent, but affirmatively raised issues pro se on direct
appeal beyond those raised in the brief filed by petitioner's
counsel.

Under Hafen, petitioner cannot now attempt to use the

remedy of post-conviction relief as a secondary appellate
process.
Petitioner cites several cases in support of his claim
that waiver does not apply if a petitioner claims ineffective
counsel and was represented by the same counsel at trial and on
direct appeal.

Brief of Appellant at p. 18. Wiley v. State, 517

So. 2d 1373, 1378 (Miss. 1987); Bear v. State, 417 N.W. 2d 467,
472 (Iowa App. 1987); People v. Fordy 99 111. App. 3d 973, 55
111.Dec. 365, 426 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1981); State v. Hunt, 26

Md.App. 417, 338 A.2d 95, 100 (1975).

However, these cases are

distinguishable by the fact that none of the petitioners in the
above cited cases filed a separate pro sefcriefon direct appeal
raising additional grounds for review.

In any event, this Court

in Hafen held that even where petitioner is represented by the
same counsel at trial and on direct appeal, silence is waiver.
Hafen 632 P.2d at 876.
Petitioner further asserts that because he is a lay
person, he could not be reasonably expected to recognize and
raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Appellant at p. 21.

Brief of

In support, petitioner cites State v. Hunt,

26 Md.App. 417, 338 A.2d 95, 97 (1975).
Hunt is distinguishable where the lower court found
that a conflict of interest existed between Hunt and six codefendants who were all represented by the same attorney.

Id.

Because the conflict of interest was considered a "special
circumstance*1 justifying an exception to the waiver rule, Hunt
was allowed to raise issues for the first time in a postconviction action.

Id.

In the instant case, petitioner has not shown an
•'unusual circumstance," nor did the lower court find one.

The

assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on
appeal does not constitute Many of the unusual circumstances
referred to in Bryant v. Turner, supra."

Hafen 632 P.2d at 876.

In the absence of "unusual circumstances," petitioner's claims
are deemed waived.

Increasingly, criminal defendants are filing postconviction actions claiming ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel as grounds for relief.

As discussed earlier,

this Court has repeatedly expressed that post-conviction actions
cannot be used as an Malternative appeal mechanism."
660 P.2d at 1105.

Codianna,

To allow an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim "to qualify for the unusual circumstances exception would
allow that exception to swallow the rule." J^d. A postconviction petitioner would merely need to assert that a latent
discovered error occurred and that his attorney must have been
ineffective for failing to raise it earlier.

Thus, any issue not

raised on direct appeal could be addressed in post-conviction
action by merely claiming attorney oversight.

The result is a

secondary appellate process before a single trial judge which
effectively puts the original trial on trial. A further result
is a duplicated judicial process which creates a substantial
burden on the court system and contravenes "the finaliity of
criminal judgments that is the settled policy of this state."
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1105.

For these reasons, a strict waiver

rule must be applied in post-conviction actions and the remedy of
Habeas Corpus must be preserved for those instances which are
truly extraordinary.
POINT II
BECAUSE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE UNSUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD, THIS COURT MUST PRESUME
REGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial and on appeal.

In support of his claim, he engages in
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extensive argument based upon facts contained in the original
criminal trial record.

However, the record on appeal, as

certified by the Third District Court Clerk, does not contain the
original criminal trial record. (R. 1)

Instead, the appellate

record consists of two volumes, the habeas court record
containing the filings of the parties and a transcript of a
hearing held August 3, 1987.
In reviewing a lower Court's ruling, this Court has
consistently held that M[t]he burden of showing error is on the
party who seeks to upset the judgment.

In the absence of record

evidence to the contrary, we assume regularity in the proceedings
below, and affirm the judgment."
1267 (Utah 1982).

State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263,

"This Court simply cannot rule on a question

which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by
the record.

State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1983)

cert, denied 460 U.S. 1044 (1983); see also State v. Steqqell,
660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983).

A petitioner "may not prevail on

ineffectiveness claims where he has only raised the possibility
of ineffective assistance of counsel but failed to offer evidence
thereon."

State v. Colonna, No. 870136, slip op. at 10 (Utah

Sup. Ct. December 13, 1988).
In the trial court below, the judge ruled as follows:
Based on review of the brief filed on
behalf of the respondent and all of
petitioner's [sic] submissions and the sworn
testimony of petitioner, the court finds that
all issues raised could have or should have
been raised at the time of appeal and for
that reason the petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus is denied.

15-

(R. 143)(Emphasis Added).

On appeal from a denial of habeas

corpus relief, this Court must "survey the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and [this Court]
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ
should be granted.-

Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443

P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968)(citations omitted).

Where the trial court

refused to reach the merits of the petition due to procedural
default, this Court should not consider the unsupported
allegations contained in the petition beyond a determination
whether the trial court properly found procedural default to
exist.

Therefore, this Court should decline petitioner's

invitation to consider the merits of his ineffective assistance
claims.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, respondent
respectfully requests this court to affirm the lower court's
dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

ffthr
DATED this

if

day of December, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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ever informal the daim may be, it need
only give "notice to the parties and to the
commission of the material facts on which
the right asserted is to depend and against
whom claim is made.**1
In the instant case, the content of the
several documents filed with the Commission reveal that all interested parties, the
employer Wholesale Cleaners, the insurer
State Insurance Fund, and the Commission
were on notice of Dutson's claim and were
duly apprised of the materia), jurisdictional
facts upon which the claim was based
Further, the documents filed confirm that:
[2] In support of their remaining con- 1) Wholesale Cleaners and State Insurance
tention that the Commission was without Fund recognized liability; 2) compensation
jurisdiction to make an award, plaintiffs and medical benefits were paid, and 3)
cite portions of U.C.A., 1953, 85-1*99 and payments of compensation and medical ben85-1-100, which read respectively as fol- efits would continue. We therefore conlows:
clude that the form and substance of the
If no claim for compensation b filed with documents filed with the Commission were
the industrial commission within three adequate within the meaning, purpose and
years from the date of the Occident or the intent of the statutes, sup/% to confer jurisdsteofthe last psyment of compensation, diction upon the Commission.
the right to compensation shall be wholly
Affirmed.
barred
Whenever an employee sustains an acSTEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURcident arising out of or in the course of HAM. JJ., concur.
bis employment it shall be mandatory
that the employee tile with the commission in writing notice of such accident
vis}
iptoaif isn't
•
with a copy to the employer; if such
notice is so filed within three years of the
time of the accident the Commission shall
obtain jurisdiction to mike its award
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
when the injury becomes apparent [EmRespondent.
phasis added]
[3] Notwithstanding the fact that the
Robert W. DUNN, Defendant
foregoing statutes require either the filing
and Appellant
of a claim for compensation or the filing of
No. 17571.
a written notice of the accident in order to
invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission,
Supreme Court of Uuh.
this Court has long recognised that a claim
MayS. 1982.
for compensation need not bear any partic9
ular formality. In fact, -great liberality as
Following conviction by the Sixth Disto form and substance of an application for
compensation is to be indulged."9 How* trict Court, Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs, J.,
it determined that there was an industry
•I accident, there k no limitation as to
the timt during which the medicals must
continue to be furnished. [Emphasis addad, footnote omitted.]1
In the recent caae of Christensen v. In*
dustris! Commits/on,1 the iasue was again
presented as to whether the term "compensation," within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, includes payments
for medical expenses. We again concluded
that it did not, and reaffirmed our decision
in Kenneeott Copper.

Sir

4

1**877.

I

Ulah. 842 l»Jd 753 (1882)

8. Uuh Apes Mining Co r. todustrisl CommisStan. Ill Utah 905, 909 fM 571 (IMS)

7. HUt ¥.todustrislGomim$sioa> 79 Uuh 47. 7
tM 2*4 (1822).
8. Aetns Uh huursnet Co r. Industrial Commission. 88 Utah 235. 941 * 223 (1825)
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*** PACIFIC REPORTER, Id SERIES

of affrtvatad kidnapping and eecond-degree murder, defendant filed timely notice
of appeal. Defense counsel tiled Andtn
brief seeking to withdraw. The Supreme
Court held that defense counsel's request to
withdraw would be granted.
Ordered accordingly.
8tewart» J., concurred bi result
Criminal Lew »»lt77J
Defense counsel's request to withdraw
was granted where defense counsel had
complied in every respect with Andtn requirements by filing brief referring to possible arguments and certifying that he had
furnished copy of brief to defendant and
points raised by defendant were without

Marcus Taylor, Labium k Taylor, Richfield, for defendant and appellant
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
Gty, for plaintiff and respondent
PER CURIAM:
Following his conviction of aggravated
kidnapping1 and second degree murder,1
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defense counsel has filed an *Andtrf
brief,1 seeking now to withdraw.
Tbe facts leading up to defendant's conviction, briefly stated, are as follow*. Defendant and one Howard Scott were hitchbiking in Bantow, California, when they
obtained a ride in a motorhome driven by
Ernest Sprinkle. Together, they proceeded
In the motorhome to Las Vegas and then to
Meaquite, Nevada. In Meaquite, Mr. Sprinkle apparently became aomewhat intoxicated, and the trio left with defendant driving
the motorhome. Sometime after leaving
Meaquite, Sprinkle was struck on tbe bead

with a pistol, bound, and placed in the bathroom at the rear of the motorhome. There
is considerable dispute as to bow this occurred. The prosecution contended that defendant and Scott acted together in aasaulu
ing Sprinkle and that the pistol was defendant's. Defendant contends that Scott spontaneously assaulted and bound Sprinkle and
that the pistol was produced by Scott Defendant claims that he was fearful for his
own aafety and that he was an innocent
participant in the assault and in the events
that followed.
As the journey continued, stops were
made for the purpose of purchasing gasoline. Then in Richfield, Utah, a stop was
made at a service station in order to purchase a fuse for a CB radio in the motorborne. At this point, Sprinkle apparently
gained consciousness and, with his hands
atill bound, began to pound on tbe rear
window of the motorhome. Defendant and
Scott quickly got in the motorhome and left
the station, the former doing the driving
while the latter went to the rear to again
subdue Sprinkle. Much of this was observed by the station attendant, who reported his observations to the police.
As the motorhome left Richfield and proceeded some 20 miles to Salina, it was followed by a semi-tractor trailer. The driver
of that vehicle observed a man through the
rear window of the motorhome, who was
apparently calling to him and waiving for
some unknown reason.4 Thereafter, tbe
blind was pulled down so as to completely
cover the window.
Having been alerted by the call from the
service station attendant, a Utah Highway
Patrolman observed the motorhome in Saliaa After following H for one or two miles,
the patrolman stopped the vehicle and subsequently arrested both Scott and defendant Sprinkle's body was found in the mo-

4. Tbe witness stated that be was not oriuty
alarmed at such activity, hsvtns concluded thst
t. A ttseer Indudtd offense of murder In tbe
some sort of Sunken party was occuntas to
first dttrtt—Q* offense with which defendant
tbe motorhome.
was chars** under U.CA.. 1153, 7*4-102.
L VJCJL. 1153. H4-J02.

I

Anders v. GsMonUa. *SS VS. m . •? I.CL
ISOS, IS LMAM S53 (1SS7).

BAWDEN AND ASSOCIATES v. SMITH
Utah 711
o»M.ui*.itsrji7ii
torhoae, as was a M caliber pistol. TesU
Defense counsel has complied in every
indicated that Sprinkle had died as the re- respect with the "AndenT requiremenu as
sult of two gunshot wounds inflicted by the recently explained in Sute v. Cl*yton%
weapon, and that Scott had fired i t
Utah, 639 ?2A 168 (1961). Counsel has
At trial, Scott testified that he and de- filed a brief which refers to possible argufendant had become alarmed at Sprinkle's ments, and he has eertified that he has
activity at the Richfield service station and furnished a copy of the brief to defendant
that defendant had suggested and encourOn February 19, 1982, defendant also
aged the shooting of Sprinkle. As indicated filed a brief wherein he basically asserts a
supra, defendant claimed that he was an lack of probable cause for his arrest, illegal
unwilling participant in the crime and that search and seizure, and insufficiency of the
he was greatly relieved when stopped by evidence. Having reviewed the record and
the patrolman. Nevertheless, the jury conthe law, we are convinced that these points,
victed defendant and he was sentenced by
as well as those addressed by counsel, are
the court to two concurrent prison terms of
without merit
five yean to life
We therefore grant defense counsel's rela his request to withdraw, defense counquest
to withdraw and affirm defendant's
sel represents that he has carefully reconviction.
searched the record and the law and that he
is unable to find any arguable issues on
appeal. He indicates that he has communicated with defendant on numerous occasions regarding the appeal, the substance
and effect of which are stated as follows:
The defendant has consistently communicated to me that he is of the opinion [1]
that the trial court erred in not granting
his motion for change of venue, and [2]
that the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence of bullets which were found
in his belongings. Some months ago, the
defendant communicated to me (3) that
he felt the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict of the jury and [4]
that the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence a photograph of the body of
the victim. In my most raoent meeting
with Mr. Dunn, which occurred at the
Utah Bute Prison on January IS, 1982,1
•gtin reviewed with him all points which
he wished to raise on the appeal. At that
MttiQg, he limited himself to the claims
thst venue should have been changed and
that evidence of the bullets should have
keen suppressed. (Numbering added.]
b the brief prepared by counsel in eonJtKtioa with his request to withdraw, he
its stated the four contentions raised by
defendant (as numbered above). Under
*ch point, counsel has cited relevant autb*Hy. as well as the reoord itself, which
• • I s whh the contentions of error.

STEWART, J., concurs in the result

^

UTftufttftfTVUi

BALDEN AND ASSOCIATES and Dean
Bawden, Plaintiff, and Respondents,
v.
AMn R. SMITH and Sandra Smith.
Defendants and Appellant*.
No. 17681
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 5. 1962.

Appeal wat taken from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
James S. Sewaya, J , denying motion to
vacate sheriffs sale and set aside deficiency
Judgment The Supreme Court, Durham.
J„ held that: (1) in esse in which two
mortgages were foreclosed in the same suit,
finding that one parcel was offered and sold
separately as required by rule was supported by competent evidence; (D whm
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT
STATE OF UTAH
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oooOooo

^n;
JUDGE MICHAEL R. IfiUK

ROBERT W. DUNN
Petitioner,
PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.
GERALD L. COOK, Warden of
the Utah State Prison, State
of Utah, Department of
Corrections,

Case

NO. eiz-_mf.

Respondent.
oooOooo
COKES NOW the Petitioner, Robert W. Dunn, and for cause of
action alleges as follows:
1.

That on or about the 14th day of January 1981 Petitioner

was sentenced by the Honorable flo^ yr T^/Vftjj

#

Judge of the

Sixth Judicial District, in and for Sevier County, State of Utar*,
in

a

criminal complaint which had charged Petitioner

with

2nd

degree murder and aggravated kidnaping in Case No. 789.
2.

That Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 5 to life at

the Utah State Prison.
3.

That

Petitioner is currently located at the Utah State

Prison.

1

4.
exercise

That

Petitioner

of

is currently restrained from

his life and liberty by his placement at

the

aue

the

Utan

State Prison for the following reasons:
(a)

Judicial error,

in the trral court failure to <1> grant

Petitioner's

motion for change of venue,

motion

exclusion

for

Petitioner's

motion

Petitioner's

motion

of
to
to

photograph
suppress
prevent

(2) grant Petitioner's
number

evidence
testimony

2,

<3;

grant

and

(4)

grant

regarding

prior

conviction.
(b) That Petitioner haa ineffective assistance of counsel
in

that

during

trial counsel failed to:
trial,

Petitioner,
ana

(2)

failure

<1>

make

proper

to appeal the issues

objections

requestec

b>

(3) failure to prepare accomplice jury instructions,

(4) failure to obtain evidence from the trailer

before

its

removal from the state.
<c)

That

Petitioner

had

ineffective

counsel for the additional reasons that:
to

the

entry

of photos, <2)

assistance

(1) Counsel

Counsel stipulated to

of

stipulates
the

entry

of

evidence that may have been barred by improper search or chain of
evidence

rules,

(3) Counsel did not adequately argue the issues

on appeal but filed only an Anders brief.
(d)

That Petitioner was denied a fair trial in that: (1)

There were jury selection errors, (2) Certain jurors had previous
knowledge of the case,

and (3) Jurors had access to

information
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Salt Lake County Utah

DAVID L. WILKINSON (14 7;)
Attorney General
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK (4341)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT W. DUNN,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner
Case No. C87-4664
GERALD COOK, Wardt \,
Utah S t a t e P r i s o n ,
Respondent,

Ji idge Mi ch aej R Mi irphy
:

The • above-entitled matter was heard JI: \ t .1: ie 281 1 ; 3c ;
December f 119 8?, before

Honorable Michael R. Murphy.

i:! *as i resei it \

-presented himself.

appeared through counsel, Kimberly

Respondent

iornak, Assistant Attorney

General.
c?ument a 11d In av i ng taken the
matter under advisement now makes and enters its;.
EIMDIMSS_Qf_£ACI
1.

The CM mi I

f IIIIIH

l Ihhfiil |n j t If inner

has ir .flisfrl

two

issues in ,his post-conviction writ of habeas corpus: 1) whether

:>£

i >M i'eeei«>appeal, and

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial aru
WII»'(IM-I

UM«

en

M^ie. tion W i w«c ^ury was unfair and

prejudicial.
2.

The Court finds that petitioner's attorney file-

Anders brief in +h
conviction.

in

appealing petitioner

The Court additionally finds that |jt . i i nt

led

n the Utah Supreme Court appealing his

his ott
conviction.

ids that the two issues raised I»
petitioner
- „r se;

i

<M

»rv» . MI un wr • • ineffective assistance of

improper jury select!

aised on

either petitione
t

brief

. *

rr e C •. . - finds that peti t, luot-1 <I*tJ « uh i £-.!«••
or

may have been prejudiced.

Court finds ;,.*.
transcript of petitioner 1
that if

issue

Ihe

rmiri had to review the
*

considering

nad appeared

procedure, the Court could have

.:*

eie

ion

r, t u o i s jua

QQCI4

••i

«,., c> *,..* f » t y

*—»'*•«
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DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472)
Attorney General
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK (4341)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021

Otputy Clork

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT W

f!ik?Mf

.

Petitioner

:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

-v-

:

Case No. C87-4664

GERALD COOK, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

:

Ji idge Mix

x n. Murphy

Respondent.
The above-entitled action was heard oi i December 28,
i ni it«f , re the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Third District Court
Judge,

respondent

u i ,

and represented himself.

\

dismiss.

Petitioner was present

Respondent appeare

Assistant Attorney General.
The Court

*dered i* »•< petition and motion to

dismiss, and having heard argument finds that pet
a

--i.il h i M

1 !>' »* raised all issues raised

post-conviction

writ of habeas corpus on dir^iM. appeal

001.14

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss
be g r a n t e d f

IFIIIII I III M pi-I ill i

in I m

Wr III

nil

l l r f h r i i f i C n i p u H In1

dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this J_j

day u January, 1988.

fl~LJ. /?
Honorable Michael R. Ml
Third District Court Judqr
ATTF6T
H.DttCtiv.::^^
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IV

I hereby c e r t i f y that a true and accurate copy o f ( t h e
£ di i. .j . i in.| ii V, u

A ', III.UW>II

postage prepaid, t o Robert Dunn, Box

250, Draper Utah 84020, t h i s _ / .

day

January,

ll>88.
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